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PEOPLE V. BUZA: A STEP IN THE WRONG
DIRECTION
Emily R. Pincin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in criminal
investigations is a relatively recent development.1 Originally, DNA
profiling was developed as a means to establish paternity.2 DNA
profiling only made its way into criminal courts in 1986, when a
molecular biologist used DNA evidence to prove that a teenager was
not in fact the perpetrator of two murders.3 In 1987, a Florida rapist
became the first person in the United States to be convicted as a result
of DNA evidence.4
Now, forensic DNA is used increasingly as a crime-solving
weapon.5 For example, in 2018, California law enforcement officials
arrested the notorious Golden State Killer, i.e., Joseph James
DeAngelo, who was responsible for a series of rapes and burglaries in
the 1970s and 1980s.6 Authorities were able to track down DeAngelo
by creatively providing his DNA (which was left at old crime scenes)
to the free, open-source DNA analysis company GEDmatch, which
confirmed a DNA match to a family member that had previously
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor
Kevin D. Lapp for graciously providing his time and expertise. Thank you to Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for your indispensable edits and suggestions.
1. See Kathryn Zunno, United States v. Kincade and the Constitutionality of the Federal
DNA Act: Why We’ll Need a New Pair of Genes to Wear Down the Slippery Slope, 79 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 769, 769–70 (2005).
2. Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving – A Judicial and
Legislative
History,
FORENSIC
MAG.
(Jan. 6,
2005,
3:00
AM),
https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-judicialand-legislative-history.
3. Id.
4. Randy James, A Brief History of DNA Testing, TIME (June 19, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1905706,00.html.
5. Id.
6. Thomas Fuller & Christine Hauser, Search for ‘Golden State Killer’ Leads to Arrest of
Ex-Cop, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killerserial.html.
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submitted his or her DNA for genetic testing.7 This is not the first time
police were able to track down a criminal with the creative use of an
individual’s DNA.8
As the use of DNA in investigations continues to grow, so does
the number of ethical and legal controversies. One such controversy is
whether laws requiring the collection of DNA from every person
arrested for a felony (and some misdemeanors) is lawful under either
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under a
respective state’s constitution.
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution guarantees the
“right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”9 The constitutional right to privacy is a cornerstone in both
the Federal and California Constitutions. The right to privacy has
historically been the focal point in the debate over how the state should
balance the security of the people with individual civil liberty. In order
to bolster California’s goal to increase state security and substantially
reduce the number of unsolved crimes, the electorate included
Proposition 69 (the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and Innocence
Protection Act) on the November 2, 2004, general election ballot.10
In 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69, often referred
to as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence
Protection Act” (the “DNA Act” or the “Act”).11 Prior to the passage
of the DNA Act, California law allowed for DNA collection from only
convicted felons.12 The DNA Act allows for collection of DNA
samples of anyone arrested (for a non-exhaustive list of crimes), even
if that individual is wrongfully arrested or among the thousands of
7. Avi Selk, The Ingenious and “Dystopian” DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the
“Golden State Killer” Suspect, WASH. POST, (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-state-killer-dna-website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identifyjoseph-deangelo-as-suspect-police-say/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8b2710ec48d9.
8. In 2005, police arrested the Kansas-based killer, “BTK,” after successfully obtaining a
familial DNA match from a tissue sample from a Pap smear recently performed on his daughter.
Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK: Playing to a Serial Killer’s Ego Helped Crack the Case,
A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2006), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_the_cops_caught_btk.
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
10. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., U.C. HASTINGS SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 9 (2004), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2230&
context=ca_ballot_props.
11. The DNA Act was approved by 62 percent of voters and took effect in 2009. Proposition
69,
INST.
OF
GOVERNMENTAL
STUD.,
U.C.
BERKELEY,
(Nov. 2,
2004),
https://igs.berkeley.edu/library/elections/proposition-69; Proposition 69 (DNA), ST. OF CAL.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/bfs/prop69 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
12. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., supra note 10, at 62.
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people that are arrested every year and never charged with a crime.13
Further, the Act allows for an arrestee’s DNA to be submitted to the
state DNA database and analyzed before the arrestee is convicted or
even charged with a crime.14
Proponents of the DNA Act rely on the argument that the Act
protects the innocent, helps solve crime, and frees those wrongly
accused.15 Courts have upheld the constitutionality of similar DNA
collection statues on the grounds that the law is intended to be used
for the purpose of identifying arrestees upon booking and is thus
constitutional.16 Nevertheless, the very first subsection under
Proposition 69’s Declaration of Purpose reads, “Our communities
have a compelling interest in protecting themselves from crime.”17
Based upon the language of this subsection, opponents of the Act
opine that the Act was not designed for the purpose of quickly and
efficiently identifying arrestees but for crime-solving purposes by
extracting DNA without a warrant or individualized suspicion.18
Recently, the California Supreme Court weighed in on
California’s DNA Act in People v. Buza.19 On April 2, 2018, the court
affirmed Buza’s misdemeanor conviction for refusing to provide a
DNA sample when he was arrested for felony arson.20 At the time
Buza refused to provide a cheek swab, he had neither been found
guilty of a crime, nor had a magistrate judge determined that there had
been probable cause for his arrest.21 It is well established that, at the
time of Buza’s arrest, he was presumed innocent in the eyes of the law;
however, the DNA Act required Buza to submit a cheek swab prior to
being charged or convicted.
In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court upheld
California’s DNA Act under both the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the California Constitution.22 The Buza
13. Id.
14. Id. at 61.
15. Id. at 9.
16. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013).
17. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Text of Proposed Laws, 135 https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/
agweb/pdfs/bfs/sec_state_full_version_prop69.pdf. Based upon the plain language of the proposed
proposition, it is clear that the true legislative purpose of this initiative is crime-solving, not for
identifying arrestees.
18. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., supra note 10, at 62–63.
19. 413 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Cal. 2018).
20. Id. at 1155.
21. See id.
22. Id.
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majority missed a rare opportunity to reassert the independence and
importance of California’s Constitution, which is discussed at length
in both Justice Liu’s and Justice Cuéllar’s dissents. As discussed
below, the California Constitution protects individual rights beyond
the bounds of the United States Constitution. By failing to reassert the
independent force of California’s Constitution, which affords arrestees
greater rights than those provided by the United States Constitution,
the Buza majority took a step in the wrong direction for criminal
procedural rights. This decision signals an uphill battle to restore
precedent that appropriately reflects the core values of the California
Constitution.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
On January 21, 2009, a San Francisco police officer saw Mark
Buza running away from a police car that had burning tires.23 The
police pursued Buza and, upon searching him, found matches in his
pocket and a container of oil in his backpack.24 Close to where Buza
had been hiding, police also discovered a road flare and a bottle
containing what smelled like gasoline.25
The police arrested Buza and took him to county jail.26 Several
hours after Buza’s arrest, a sheriff’s deputy asked Buza to swab the
inside of his cheek to obtain a DNA sample.27 The deputy informed
Buza that he was required by law to provide the sample and warned
Buza that refusal to provide the sample would result in a misdemeanor
charge.28 Defendant nevertheless refused.29
The day after Buza’s arrest, a superior court judge found probable
cause to support a valid arrest for felony arson.30 The following day,
the district attorney filed a complaint charging Buza with felony arson,
as well as with misdemeanor refusal to provide a DNA specimen.31

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1137.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Buza was eventually tried by a jury.32 Buza moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the misdemeanor refusal charge on the grounds that the
Fourth Amendment does not allow for forced DNA swabs from
arrestees.33 The court denied Buza’s motion, and the jury convicted
him of all charges.34
Upon Buza’s sentencing, the court ordered him to provide a DNA
sample, and Buza again refused.35 The court thereafter authorized the
sheriff’s department to use reasonable force to obtain Buza’s DNA
sample.36 Buza subsequently complied with the order to supply the
sample and was sentenced to a prison term of over sixteen months.37
B. Case Procedure
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed Buza’s
misdemeanor conviction and held:
[T]he DNA Act, to the extent it requires felony arrestees to
submit a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and
inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases, without
independent suspicion, a warrant or even a judicial or grand
jury determination of probable cause, unreasonably intrudes
on such arrestees’ expectation of privacy and is invalid under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.38
On September 7, 2011, the California Attorney General filed a
petition for review by the California Supreme Court and presented the
question of whether the collection of forensic DNA samples from
felony arrestees violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.39 The Attorney General’s argument that review should
be granted essentially proceeded as follows: the California Court of
Appeal opinion: (1) invalidated a state voter initiative proposition; (2)
jeopardized public safety; (3) conflicted with the reasoning of state
and federal cases nationwide upholding DNA sample collection from
both arrestees and convicted offenders; and (4) was at odds with the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1137–38.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1138.
38. People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion
superseded by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
39. Petition for Review at 1, People v. Buza, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (No. S196200), 2011
WL 5073104, at *1.
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legislative judgments of twenty-four states and Congress, which have
enacted laws authorizing collection of DNA samples from some
categories of arrestees.40
The California Supreme Court granted review.41 While Buza’s
case was pending before the California Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court decided Maryland v. King42 (discussed in more
detail below), upholding a similar DNA collection procedure in
Maryland.43 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in King, the
California Supreme Court transferred Buza’s case back to the
California Court of Appeal for reconsideration.44
The California Court of Appeal again reversed Buza’s
misdemeanor conviction, this time on the grounds that the forced
DNA swab violated Buza’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution.45 The California Court of Appeal declined to decide
whether the California DNA Act and the Maryland law were
significantly different to warrant a separate Fourth Amendment
analysis than that applied by the Court in King.46
The California Supreme Court again granted review, this time to
decide whether the collection and analysis of forensic identification
DNA samples from felony arrestees violates either article I, section 13
of the California Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.47 In a sharply-divided, 4-3 decision, the California
Supreme Court upheld California’s DNA Act under both the United
Sates and California Constitutions.48

40. Id. at *2.
41. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138.
42. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
43. See generally id. (holding that using buccal swabs to obtain defendant’s DNA sample after
arrest and analyzing that sample did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
44. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138.
45. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 795–96 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal.
2018).
46. Id. at 767.
47. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138.
48. See generally id. at 1135, 1155.
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority
Buza made a number of points in support of his argument that his
misdemeanor conviction should be overturned. Buza argued that
California’s DNA Act differed from the Maryland collection law
discussed in Maryland v. King, such that these differences should
change the DNA Act’s constitutional analysis under both the Fourth
Amendment and the California Constitution.49 For instance, the
California DNA Act applies to a broader category of arrestees than the
Maryland law.50 Additionally, in California, collection and analysis of
arrestee DNA samples is permitted before the arrest is deemed valid
by a judicial determination.51 Further, under the California law, DNA
samples from exonerated arrestees (or arrestees that are never charged
or convicted) are not automatically destroyed.52 Finally, Buza argued
that the Court in King misidentified the “legitimate” government
interest of Maryland’s DNA collection law and therefore incorrectly
upheld the law.53
The majority’s holding relied mostly on the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King.54 Indeed, Justice
Kreuger, the author of the Buza majority, noted that “King, which was
issued while this appeal was pending, has significantly altered the
terms of the debate” about whether the Fourth Amendment
categorically forbids the mandatory collection of DNA from persons
who have been arrested for, but not yet convicted of, felony offenses.55
A brief discussion of King is therefore warranted.
1. Maryland v. King
In King, defendant Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first- and
second-degree assault charges.56 After King was arrested, but prior to
conviction, his cheek was swabbed, and his DNA was logged into

49. Id. at 1141, 1143.
50. Id. at 1141.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits at 52, People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal.
2015) (No. S223698), 2015 WL 5090233, at *52.
54. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1141, 1153.
55. Id. at 1139.
56. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440 (2013).
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Maryland’s DNA database.57 When King’s DNA was later analyzed
after his arraignment, the database returned a “hit” linking King’s
DNA to a DNA sample taken from a rape cold case.58 This evidence
was presented to a grand jury, which called for an indictment.59 As a
result, a warrant was procured to obtain a second DNA sample that
could be used as evidence in the rape case against King.60 King filed
a motion to suppress the DNA evidence on the grounds that it
infringed upon his Fourth Amendment rights.61
The United States Supreme Court decision was close, but the
result was a 5-4 ruling in favor of the State of Maryland.62 The
majority described Maryland’s DNA law as follows: “The Act
authorizes Maryland law enforcement authorities to collect DNA
samples [in the form of a buccal cheek swab] from ‘an individual who
is charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime
of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.’”63 The
Court found that the Maryland law did not violate the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.64
The Court recognized that, though taking a cheek swab from an
arrestee does constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, such
a search is reasonable because: (1) arrestees in custody for a crime
supported by probable cause have a diminished expectation of
privacy; (2) the swab involved minimal intrusion and is quick and
painless; and (3) a legitimate government interest is served.65 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the government’s interest
in identifying and processing arrestees weighed strongly in favor of
collecting DNA samples.66
The scathing dissent, written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia
and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan, maintained that “categorically” and “without
57. Id. at 441.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court denied his motion, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. Id. The state
of Maryland then appealed the ruling and requested that the issue be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 442.
62. See id. at 438.
63. Id. at 443 (alteration in original).
64. Id. at 465–66.
65. See id. at 465.
66. Id. at 449.
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exception,” the “Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for
evidence of a crime where there is no basis for believing the person is
guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence.”67
Justice Scalia even read his dissent from the bench, “signaling deep
disagreement” with the majority’s decision.68 In response to the
majority’s argument that the cheek swab search is non-invasive,
Justice Scalia noted, “No matter the degree of invasiveness,
suspicionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is
ordinary crime-solving.”69
Additionally, the dissent called out the majority’s argument that
the Maryland law is reasonable because it served the special purpose
of “identifying” arrestees.70 The dissent rebutted that assertion and
argued that “identification” was not the true goal of the Maryland law;
instead, the purpose was to “search[] for evidence that [the arrestee]
committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.”71 Further,
King’s DNA was not tested until he was arraigned, days after his
arrest, because Maryland law forbids officials from doing so.72 The
dissent pointed out that officials likely did not wait until King’s
arraignment to ask him his name or take his fingerprints.73
Accordingly, Maryland’s law could not logically be understood
merely as an “identification” tool.
2. The Differences Between California’s DNA Act and
Maryland’s DNA Collection Law Do Not Change
the Fourth Amendment Analysis
The Buza majority, whose opinion was written by Justice Kruger,
held that California’s DNA Act violates neither the United States
Constitution nor the California Constitution.
As previously mentioned, Buza highlighted three features of
California’s DNA Act that distinguished his case from King: (1) the
DNA Act applies to a broader category of arrestees than the Maryland
law; (2) the DNA Act authorizes both collection and testing of DNA

67. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. Adam Liptak, Justices Allow DNA Collection After an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/us/supreme-court-says-police-can-take-dna-samples.html.
69. King, 569 U.S. at 469.
70. Id. at 469–70.
71. Id. at 470.
72. See id. at 471; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(1) (West 2019).
73. King, 569 U.S. at 471.
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samples before a judicial determination has been made that an
arrestee’s charges are valid; and (3) the DNA Act does not provide for
automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the arrestee is cleared of
felony charges.74
The California Supreme Court addressed each of these
differences in turn. The court first addressed the scope of the DNA
Act’s collection requirement.75 The court disregarded the first
difference identified by Buza and held that he cannot reasonably
“attack a statute on grounds that are not shown to be applicable to
himself.”76 Because Buza was arrested for a “serious felony” (arson),
he could not attack California’s DNA Act based on its potential
application to other, differently-situated individuals.77
Next, the court addressed Buza’s concern that California’s DNA
Act, unlike Maryland’s law, allows officials to load an arrestee’s DNA
sample into a state-wide database and analyze it before the arrestee
has been arraigned or before there has been a judicial determination
that the arrest was valid.78 The court determined that any differences
between the California law and the Maryland law regarding the timing
of the collection of DNA would not change the constitutional analysis
in this case because DNA collection upon booking is a “legitimate
police booking procedure.”79
Nevertheless, Buza argued that it was the second step (the testing
and recording of his DNA) that represented a great privacy intrusion.80
The court observed that the reasoning of the majority in King did not
lend support to Buza’s argument that the analysis and recording of his
DNA should be delayed until a probable cause finding has been
made.81 Buza argued that there would be no burden on law
enforcement to delay such testing and recording until a probable cause
determination had been made since it takes, on average, approximately

74. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Cal. 2018).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1142 (quoting In re Cregler, 363 P.2d 305, 308 (Cal. 1961)).
77. See id. at 1142.
78. Id. at 1142–43.
79. Id. at 1143. Nevertheless, California’s DNA Act allows for collection of DNA
“immediately following arrest.” Id. (“As to the timing of collection, there is no reason to believe
that the differences between California’s law and Maryland’s change the Fourth Amendment
balance applicable in this case.”).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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thirty days to generate an identification profile from an arrestee’s
DNA sample.82
The court eventually concluded that it “[could not] proceed on the
assumption that a rule delaying the collection or processing of samples
until after a judicial probable cause finding or arraignment would pose
no meaningful risk of interference with the central interest identified
in King: the accurate identification of arrestees who are taken into
police custody.”83
Finally, the court acknowledged Buza’s concern that some
arrestees who provide DNA samples may never be charged with a
crime or—if charged—convicted.84 Buza contended that California’s
DNA Act allows the state to retain an arrestee’s DNA sample and
associated records for an extended period of time and argued,
essentially, that the DNA Act’s expungement provisions are
insufficient.85 Regardless, the court deferred to the King ruling, where
the majority attached no significance to Maryland’s expungement
procedures in the constitutional analysis.86 The court refused to
address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires
automatic expungement of DNA samples for those that are exonerated
or wrongfully arrested “because defendant in this case [was]
neither.”87
In sum, the court found that any differences between California’s
and Maryland’s DNA collection laws did not affect the Fourth
Amendment analysis, and as such, Buza’s misdemeanor refusal
conviction did not violate his federal constitutional rights.88
3. The DNA Act Does Not Violate the California Constitution
Buza also argued, and the California Court of Appeal held, that
even if requiring him to furnish a DNA sample as part of his arrest
booking procedure did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, it
violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which
affords arrestees greater rights than those provided by the United

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1144.
Id.
Id. at 1145.
See id. at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
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States Constitution.89 The California Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the search under the California Constitution by
weighing the gravity of the governmental interest or public concern
served against the degree to which the government conduct interferes
with individual liberty.90
The court thus presented the question of whether adequate
reasons existed to conclude, despite the high court’s ruling in King,
that California voters exceeded constitutional bounds in mandating the
collection of a DNA sample from arrestees.91 Buza argued that there
were several reasons to depart from the Supreme Court’s ruling in
King. Buza asserted that the Supreme Court’s balancing test in King
was flawed because the “legitimate governmental interest” was
misidentified.92 Though the King Court concluded that collecting
DNA from people arrested for serious offenses serves the “legitimate
governmental interest” in safely and accurately identifying the person
in custody, Buza argued that arrestee DNA information is not used for
identification purposes, but solely for investigation of possible other
crimes.93 Much like Justice Scalia’s dissent in King, Buza’s argument
was that gathering information for such a purpose is unreasonable in
the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion.94
The court briefly acknowledged Buza’s argument that DNA
samples could be misused for investigative purposes; nevertheless, the
court cited and deferred to its earlier decision in People v. Robinson,95
where the court held that DNA collection from those convicted of
dangerous felonies was constitutional because of its ability to
accurately identify criminal offenders.96 The court reminded Buza that
DNA samples, such as cheek swabs, function as an identification tool
in the same way as fingerprinting, which has been upheld as
reasonable.97

89. Id.
90. See id. (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 650 (1994)).
91. Id. at 1150.
92. See Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 53, at 88.
93. Id.
94. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1150.
95. People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55 (Cal. 2010).
96. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1150–51 (citing Robinson, 224 P.3d at 65). The court cited to this case
to support the constitutionality of the DNA Act, despite the significance in the difference of
circumstances between Robinson and Buza’s case.
97. Id. at 1151 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 451 (2013)).
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The court rejected Buza’s claim that King ignored the highly
sensitive nature of genetic data revealed by an individual’s DNA.98
The court argued that DNA profiles are created by the non-coding
sections of DNA and thus do not reveal any sensitive genetic data.99
Further, the court acknowledged that the DNA Act forbids the use of
DNA information for nonidentification purposes and, thus, does not
implicate a privacy interest.100
Finally, in addressing Buza’s argument that article I, section 13
of the California Constitution gives arrestees greater privacy rights
than those afforded under the Fourth Amendment, the court offered a
lengthy “reaffirmation” about the deference and respect that should be
provided to decisions of the high court.101 The court recognized that
state constitutional law is independent from federal constitutional law
and that decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting
parallel federal text are not binding.102 Nonetheless, the court said that
“this court ordinarily resolve[s] questions about the legality of
searches and seizures by construing the Fourth Amendment and article
I, section 13 in tandem.”103
The court held, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has resolved
the question before us under the Fourth Amendment.”104 Buza’s
attempt to argue that the differences between the DNA Act and the
law at issue in King should alter the state constitutional analysis was
futile.105 For reasons noted above, the court refused to reassess the
constitutionality of the DNA Act as it applied to Buza’s case.106
Because the court found no reasons to justify rejecting the Supreme
Court’s guidance, Buza’s misdemeanor conviction was upheld under
the California Constitution.107

98. Id. at 1152.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1148–49.
102. Id. at 1148.
103. Id. at 1149.
104. Id. at 1150.
105. Id. at 1151.
106. Id. at 1135, 1149 (“[T]his court ordinarily resolve[s] questions about the legality of
searches and seizure by construing the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 13 in tandem.”).
107. Id.
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B. The Liu Dissent
Justice Goodwin Liu wrote the first dissent, stating that the DNA
Act should not require an arrest to be judicially validated before an
arrestee is required to provide a DNA sample.108 Justice Liu further
argued that the Act’s failure to provide for automatic expungement of
DNA samples of individuals who were exonerated, acquitted, or not
even charged is “troubling” for both practical reasons and
constitutional reasons.109
Finally, Justice Liu argued that the majority failed to respect the
independence of California’s Constitution by adopting essentially a
rebuttable “presumption of correctness.”110 Justice Liu rejected the
majority’s approach and, instead, asked, “whether we should reject the
high court’s Fourth Amendment guidance.”111 Humbly citing his own
law review article, Justice Liu discussed the importance of judicial
federalism and the importance of interpreting the guarantees of
California’s Constitution without according a presumption of
correctness to high court precedent.112
Justice Liu concluded that Buza’s conviction for refusing to
comply with the DNA Act was invalid under the California
Constitution.113 He did not reach the question of whether Buza’s
conviction would also be invalid under the Fourth Amendment.114
C. The Cuéllar Dissent
Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar wrote the second, sixteenpage dissent and was joined by Justice Dennis Perluss.115 Justice
Cuéllar’s dissent expressed agreement with Justice Liu’s remarks and
108. Id. at 1156 (Liu, J., dissenting). Justice Liu believed quite the opposite: the fact that Buza
was found “validly arrested on probable cause . . . and was promptly charged with” that offense has
“[no] bearing on whether it was lawful to require him to provide his DNA before any of those
determinations were made.” Id.
109. Id. at 1158–59. Justice Liu documents the copious leaps and bounds an individual must
overcome in order to get his DNA sample expunged: “The extensive documentation, notice to
multiple parties, judicial hearing, and additional steps required for expungement place a significant
burden on eligible persons, assuming they are even aware of the process.” Id. at 1157. Further, the
statute also reads, “The court has the discretion to grant or deny the request for expungement. The
denial of a request for expungement is a nonappealable order . . . .” Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 299
(West 2014).
110. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1161.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1163.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1163–78 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
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offered individualized arguments as well. In its most relevant part,
Justice Cuéllar’s dissent rejected the majority’s holding because it
failed to consider what role the California Constitution plays in
determining whether the rights of a California citizen have been
violated; essentially, the majority “contends that the scope of the
legitimate privacy rights of persons arrested is no different under [the
California] constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.”116
Despite its identical wording to the Fourth Amendment, Justice
Cuéllar asserted that article I, section 13 of the California Constitution
provided heightened protections for the privacy rights of individuals,
including those that have been arrested.117 Justice Cuéllar, though
acknowledging that Supreme Court decisions deserve “respectful
consideration,” argued that the California Supreme Court was
“obligated” to perform an independent analysis regarding whether the
California Constitution provided protection against the search at
issue.118
Justice Cuéllar referred to the court’s summary in Raven v.
Deukmejian,119 which lists the “numerous decisions” from the
California Supreme Court where the court interpreted the state
constitution as extending protections to California citizens beyond
those assured by the United States Supreme Court under the United
States Constitution.120 Further, he recognized that within the context
of search and seizure of arrestees, California has been explicit in
holding that the state constitution provides greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.121 Justice
Cuéllar cited to a California Supreme Court case that held that, even
upon full custodial arrest, booking, and incarceration, police may not
search an arrestee in the hope of discovering evidence of a more
serious crime, making clear that arrestees in California enjoy greater
protections against searches and seizures under the state
constitution.122
To offer more support for his argument that the California
Constitution garners broader privacy protections than the United
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1164 (emphasis added).
801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
Buza, 413 P.3d at 1165 (citing Raven, 801 P.2d at 1088).
Id.
Id.
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States Constitution, Justice Cuéllar cited to article I, section 1 of the
California Constitution: “All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy.”123 Justice Cuéllar noted that article I does not create a
separate class of privacy rights but argued that, at a minimum, it
“underscores how certain infringements of personal privacy deserve
heightened scrutiny in our search and seizure analysis relative to what
the federal analysis requires.”124
After “assign[ing] proper weight and meaning to the California
Constitution,” Justice Cuéllar argued that the search in question was
not reasonable.125 First, Justice Cuéllar criticized the governmental
“need” to create a DNA profile of an arrestee for the purpose of
“identification.”126 Justice Cuéllar discussed that fingerprinting is a
much quicker and less-intrusive means of providing identification
information.127 Therefore, Justice Cuéllar found it unlikely that
“identification” was truly the interest the government sought to
further.128 Instead, Justice Cuéllar said, “[T]he most plausible
justification for the present DNA collection is that it aids in identifying
arrestees who may have been perpetrators of unsolved crimes.”129
Though solving crimes can certainly constitute a legitimate
government interest, that interest is not sufficient to overcome the
privacy rights of arrestees.130 Citing to Ingersoll v. Palmer,131 Justice
Cuéllar noted that the law requires the government to have
individualized suspicion that an individual has committed a specific
offense for the search or seizure to be valid.132
Justice Cuéllar also disapproved of the majority’s assertion that
Buza did not have a right to challenge the scope of the collection
123. Id. at 1167; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights.”).
124. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1167.
125. Id. at 1178.
126. Id. at 1169.
127. On average, a DNA profile takes about thirty days to complete. On the contrary, law
enforcement officials can collect fingerprints, compare them against a database, and obtain a
response as to any identification “hits” within approximately twenty-seven minutes. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1170.
130. See id. at 1169.
131. 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987).
132. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1170 (citing Ingersoll, 743 P.2d at 1303–04).
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requirement in the DNA Act.133 At the time Buza refused to provide a
DNA sample, he (should have) “enjoyed the presumption of
innocence” because the disposition of his felony charges were
uncertain; as such, Buza had every right to challenge the DNA Act as
an arrestee who could eventually be acquitted of felony charges.134
Justice Cuéllar warned that failure to reach this issue meant that a
“future plaintiff [would] suffer irreversible adverse consequences.”135
Finally, Justice Cuéllar argued that the DNA Act merited a
different constitutional analysis than what was required for the
Maryland law in King.136 Unlike the Maryland law, the DNA Act does
not require that a lawful arrest have occurred before DNA
collection.137 Additionally, though the Maryland DNA collection law
provides for automatic expungement and destruction of DNA if the
individual is not convicted of a felony, the California DNA Act does
not.138
In conclusion, Justice Cuéllar argued that, under the California
Constitution, arrestees are accorded a higher expectation of privacy
than under the United States Constitution.139 “[W]hen weighed against
the State’s generalized interest in identifying arrestees and solving
crimes, an arrestee’s reasonable privacy interest in his or her genetic
information—uniquely protected under the California Constitution—
must win.”140

133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Indeed, the majority recognized that “we must leave for another day” the question of
whether automatic expungement is constitutionally required for the wrongly arrested or exonerated.
Id. at 1146 (majority opinion).
136. See id. at 1176 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
137. To the contrary, the DNA Act allows for retrieval and processing of a DNA sample before
a judicial officer has determined that the arrest was valid. Id. In Maryland, a DNA sample may not
be taken until the arrestee has been arraigned. Id. at 1142 (majority opinion). Additionally, nearly
one in five felony arrestees are released prior to a judicial determination of probable cause;
however, such arrestees are still required to allow their DNA to be collected and retained for at
least 180 days. Id. at 1176 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Department of Justice shall destroy a
specimen and sample and expunge the searchable DNA database profile pertaining to the person
who has no present or past qualifying offense of record upon receipt of order that verifies the
applicant has made the necessary showing at a noticed hearing, and that includes . . . [a] court order
verifying that no retrial or appeal of the case is pending, that it has been at least 180 days . . . .”);
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(c)(2)(D) (West 2014).
138. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1145 (majority opinion).
139. See id. at 1163, 1165 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1177.
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IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. California Constitutionalism and Criminal Procedure
The California Constitution is one of the longest in the world.141
The length of California’s Constitution is largely due to additions by
California ballot propositions and voter initiatives.142 A number of the
provisions of the California Constitution are identical to those of the
United States Constitution.143 Nevertheless, an interpretation by the
United States Supreme Court of a provision of the United States
Constitution does not mean that a similarly—or identically—worded
provision of the California Constitution must necessarily be
interpreted in the same manner, particularly where the history, past
interpretation, or intent of the state constitutional provision supports a
more expansive reading.144 For example, in his dissent in Michigan v.
Mosley,145 Justice Brennan observed that “[e]ach [s]tate has power to
impose higher standards governing police practices under state law
than is required by the United States Constitution.”146
In combination, Justice Liu’s and Justice Cuéllar’s dissents argue
that the California Constitution protects individual rights broadly and
beyond those rights provided by the United States Constitution. This
doctrine, state constitutionalism, has also been referred to as the “new
judicial federalism.”147 During the Warren Court years, both the
federal and California high courts expanded criminal procedure
rights.148 State constitutionalism emerged during the early 1970s when
the Warren Court gave way to that of Chief Justice Burger, and was

141. BRIAN P. JANISKEE & KEN MASUGI, DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 27 (2d ed. 2008).
142. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Foreword to JOSEPH R. GRODIN, ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE
CONSTITUTION xxiii, xxv–xxvi (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2nd ed. 2016) (“Many commentators have
observed the relative ease by which the California Constitution can be amended through the
initiative process and have accurately highlighted how this unusual attribute of our state
constitutional structure has expanded our state constitution.”).
143. Compare CAL. CONST. (laying out the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
state government in articles IV–VI), with U.S. CONST. (similarly laying out the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the federal government in articles I–III).
144. Cantil-Sakauye, supra note 142, at xxv.
145. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
146. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161 (1998).
148. David Aram Kaiser & David A. Carrillo, California Constitutional Law, Reanimating
Criminal Procedure Rights After the “Other” Proposition 8, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 33, 34
(2016).
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vehemently supported by Justice Brennan.149 In fact, Justice Brennan
wrote in 1986, “Rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader
protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitution . . .
is probably the most important development in constitutional
jurisprudence in our time.”150
When Chief Justice Burger’s tenure on the Supreme Court began,
Justice Brennan called on state high courts to hold onto the steps taken
to broaden criminal procedure jurisprudence by basing constitutional
rulings on state constitutions, which could potentially provide broader
protections than those provided by the United States Constitution.151
Historically, California was a progressive leader in developing
individual rights under the California Constitution.152 In particular, the
California Supreme Court was a frontrunner in expanding rights
regarding state criminal procedure.153
In 1955, the California Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule to evidence that had been illegally obtained by the government.154
In People v. Wheeler,155 the California Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor’s racially-biased use of peremptory strikes of potential
jurors violated the state constitutional right to be tried by a fair and
impartial jury.156 In Wheeler, the court refused to follow the contrary
federal rule set forth in Swain v. Alabama.157 In other cases, the
149. Id.; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (“Every believer in our concept of federalism, and I am
a devout believer, must salute this development in our state courts.”).
150. Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New Jersey Supreme Court, and State
Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763, 763
(1998).
151. Kaiser & Carrillo, supra note 148, at 34.
152. DAVID A. CARRILLO, GOVERNING CALIFORNIA: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN THE GOLDEN STATE 301–02 (Ethan Rarick ed., 3d ed. 2013).
153. See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863,
884–87 (2000).
154. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955). This California Supreme Court decision
came six years before the United States Supreme Court applied the federal exclusionary rule against
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
155. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
156. Id. at 766.
157. 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 767–77; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965) (The court stated it saw “no reason, except for blind application of a proof standard
developed in a context where there is no question of state responsibility for the alleged
exclusion, why the defendant attacking the prosecutor’s systematic use of challenges against
Negroes should not be required to establish on the record the prosecutor’s conduct in this regard,
especially where the same prosecutor for many years is said to be responsible for this practice and
is quite available for questioning on this matter.”).
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California Supreme Court continued to expand the protections
afforded to individuals against warrantless searches and seizures in
ways that went far beyond what was required by the United States
Constitution.158
In each of the above cases, the California Supreme Court
interpreted the guarantees of the California Constitution “without
according any deference or presumption of correctness to high court
precedent.”159 In his dissent, Justice Liu noted that “on each of these
issues, the high court eventually overruled its precedent and adopted
as a matter of federal law the rule we had adopted as a matter of state
law.”160 However, in 1982, California’s historical “progressiveness”
was dismantled, and the scale of criminal procedural law tilted toward
crime control.161
B. The End of California Constitutionalism
California’s progressive approach to criminal procedure has
drawn extensive criticism and calls for reform.162 Additionally, not all
California courts agreed with the high court’s use of the independent
state grounds doctrine to avoid the United States Supreme Court
rulings.163 As a result, opponents of California’s broad criminal
procedure protections turned to the California Constitution, article II,
section 8 to remove individual rights by initiative. Because of these
initiatives, California is now unique for providing no state
158. See generally People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1009, 1009 (Cal. 1975) (holding that police
officers cannot subject a motorist to a full body and vehicle search unless the officer has articulable
reasons to suspect other illegal conduct); People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 238 (Cal. 1975) (holding
that where defendant’s arrest could only have been for violation of traffic laws and there was no
evidence providing probable cause, seizure was unlawful); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d
590, 590 (Cal. 1974) (ruling that examination of one’s bank records violates the state constitutional
right to privacy).
159. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1162 (Cal. 2018) (Liu, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Kaiser & Carrillo, supra note 148, at 37.
162. See, e.g., John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule:
An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109,
1110–11 (1982).
163. See People v. Lance W. (In re Lance W.), 197 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (1983) (stating that there
is a “history of the decades long debate that has focused on the efficacy of . . . state’s use of the
doctrine of independent state grounds to avoid the impact of federal high court decisions in the
Fourth Amendment area”), vacated, 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); see also People v. Norman, 538
P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1975) (“A sudden switch to a California ground to avoid the impact of federal
high court decisions invites the successful use of the initiative process to overrule the California
decision with its concomitant harm to the prestige, influence, and function of the judicial branch of
state government.”).
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constitutional protection to its citizens, beyond that required by the
United States Constitution, in the majority of the areas of
constitutional criminal procedure.
In 1982, California advanced its war on crime when citizens
passed into law Proposition 8’s Right to Truth-in-Evidence
provision.164 Proposition 8, known also as the Victim’s Bill of Rights,
added section 28 to article I of the California Constitution and
introduced a “Right to Truth-in-Evidence.”165 The Right to Truth-inEvidence provision provided that, absent a few exceptions, “relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.”166 As a
result, section 28 abrogated numerous judicially-created rules that
previously excluded certain evidence seized as a violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights.167 Essentially, Proposition 8
severely limited an individual’s search and seizure exclusionary rule
rights under the California Constitution to no more than what is
required by the federal government.168
In In re Lance W.,169 the Truth-in-Evidence provision of
Proposition 8 faced its first significant constitutional challenge
regarding searches and seizures.170 Prior to passing Proposition 8,
California case decisions required the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the California
Constitution “under circumstances in which the evidence would be
admissible under federal constitutional principles.”171 One question
164. See Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior Misconduct Impeachment
Evidence in California Criminal Cases, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 621, 621 (1991).
165. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2).
166. Id.
167. See id.; see also In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747 (“Approaching Proposition 8 in that spirit,
we conclude that Proposition 8 has abrogated both the ‘vicarious exclusionary rule’ under which a
defendant had standing to object to the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of
a third person, and a defendant’s right to object to and suppress evidence seized in violation of the
California, but not the federal, Constitution.”).
168. See generally In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747 (holding that “[p]roposition 8 has abrogated
both the ‘vicarious exclusionary rule’ under which a defendant has standing to object to the
introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of a third person, and a defendant’s right
to object to and suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but not the federal,
Constitution”).
169. 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985).
170. See id. at 747; see also Randall A. Cohen & Mark D. Klein, Proposition 8: California Law
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1985) (“The California
Supreme Court has, for the first time, in the case of In re Lance W., unequivocally recognized that
the doctrine of independent state grounds as it relates to the admissibility of evidence in a criminal
trial is no longer valid.”).
171. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747.
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posed in In re Lance W., therefore, was whether any right to suppress
evidence under the California Constitution survived beyond the
minimum rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.172
The court in In re Lance W. concluded that “Proposition 8 . . .
eliminate[d] a judicially created remedy for violations of the search
and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the
exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion
remains federally compelled.”173 This meant that illegally-obtained
evidence that would have normally been excluded under the California
Constitution would now be admissible evidence unless federal law
dictated otherwise. This holding represented a significant departure
from California’s broader exclusionary rule and general search and
seizure protections.
After the ruling in In re Lance W., the California legislature
proposed another proposition that threatened California
constitutionalism. In 1990, Californians approved Proposition 115,
which read, “Amends state Constitution regarding criminal and
juvenile cases: affords accused no greater constitutional rights than
federal Constitution affords.”174 The California Supreme Court
abrogated Proposition 115 as an unconstitutional restriction on the
court’s ability to interpret the California Constitution.175 The court in
Raven struck down this addition to article I, section 24 of the
California Constitution as “a constitutional revision beyond the scope
of the initiative process.”176
Effectively, the Raven court reaffirmed the role of state
constitutionalism. Similar to the majority in Buza, the Raven court
acknowledged that the California Supreme Court has often deferred to
the United States Supreme Court when interpreting identical language
found in the federal and state constitutions;177 however, the court in
Raven appropriately held that it would be improper for the California
Supreme Court to mandate state courts’ “blind obedience” to United

172. Id.
173. Id. at 752.
174. California Proposition 115, the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act” (1990),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_115,_the_%22Crime_Victims_
Justice_Reform_Act%22_(1990) (last visited Dec. 8, 2019); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b)
(enacted by Proposition 115).
175. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Cal. 1990).
176. Id. at 1086.
177. Id. at 1088.
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States Supreme Court decisions, despite the existence of “cogent
reasons,” “independent state interests,” or “strong countervailing
circumstances” supporting a departure from the highest court’s
rulings.178
V. ANALYSIS
In People v. Buza, the majority failed to consider the “cogent
reasons” and “independent state interests” that should have led the
court to construe California’s identically-worded constitutional
language differently from the United States Constitution. Despite the
general rule that deference should be given to higher court rulings,
California courts have the authority to adopt an independent
interpretation of the California Constitution, even if its language is
identical to that of the United States Constitution.179
The Buza majority failed to recognize the significant differences
between the Maryland law and California’s DNA Act. By failing to
recognize those differences, the court fell into a deferential trap,
missed the opportunity to reassert California’s independent
constitutionalism, and blindly relied upon the arguments provided by
the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King.
A. The California DNA Act Warranted a Different Constitutional
Analysis Than That Applied in King
Because the Maryland DNA collection law substantially differs
from California’s DNA Act, a different constitutional analysis was
warranted when reviewing the constitutionality of the DNA Act.
Considering the substantial differences between the Maryland law and
the California law, California’s DNA Act violates both the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution.
While California’s DNA collection statute is similar in many
ways to the Maryland law that was upheld in King, there are three
significant differences. First, the DNA Act applies to a broader
category of arrestees than the Maryland law.180 Second, unlike the
Maryland law, the DNA Act authorizes both DNA collection and
testing before charges are filed and before a finding of probable

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Cal. 2018).
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cause.181 Finally, unlike the Maryland law, California’s DNA Act does
not provide for automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the
arrestee is cleared of the crime.182
Of these three differences, the second is the most significant when
analyzing the constitutionality of the DNA Act. The Maryland DNA
Collection Act applies only to arrestees who are already in valid police
custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.183 In
contrast, California’s DNA Act applies to all felony arrestees (and
some misdemeanant arrestees), regardless of whether or not their
arrest was supported by probable cause.184 This raises a number of
legal and ethical issues, the biggest issue being whether or not such a
law violates an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
1. California’s DNA Act Violates the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”185 It is well established that collection
of DNA samples is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and that, as a general rule, a warrantless search or a search
without individualized suspicion is usually unreasonable.186 As the
majority in both King and Buza recognize, the “touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”187
The King majority relied on Illinois v. McArthur,188 which noted
that individualized suspicion is not categorically required: “In some
circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special law enforcement
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the
like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual,
circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48 (2013).
184. See generally Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 53, at 71, 95 (“But, in
California, both collection and submission of the DNA occurs immediately following arrest, prior
to any judicial review of probable cause and even prior to any prosecutorial charging decision.”).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
186. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
187. King, 569 U.S. at 448; Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140.
188. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
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reasonable.”189 The Buza majority deferred to the reasoning in King
that a cheek swab of an arrestee at the time of booking falls into the
category of “routine searches” that is justified by “special law
enforcement needs.”190 Interestingly, the King Court failed to identify
and explain what constitutes “special law enforcement needs.”191
Special law enforcement needs, however, reflect that the need must
always be justified by concerns “other than crime detection.”192
In King, the Court relied on a balancing test to decide whether or
not the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.193
According to case precedent, such a balancing test is appropriate when
“the need for a warrant is greatly diminished”—for instance, when an
arrestee is already in valid police custody for a serious offense
supported by probable cause.194 Such an argument makes sense in
King’s case, where the applicable Maryland DNA collection statute
applies only to those that have been charged with serious crimes
supported by probable cause.
In cases such as Buza’s, where the applicable California DNA
statute is triggered “immediately following arrest” before probable
cause is determined, the reasonableness balancing test is ineffectual.
Of course, there is a legitimate government interest in identifying
arrestees and protecting the safety of law enforcement officials that
are tasked with processing and handling said arrestees. Regardless,
that governmental interest should not open the door to invasive genetic
testing when there are alternative methods for identification that are
less of an intrusion of privacy. Even more troublesome is the State’s
use of the arrestee’s DNA for crime-solving purposes. Though there
is a “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches,”195 that category has never included searches
designed to serve “the normal need for law enforcement.”196

189. King, 569 U.S. at 447 (quoting McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330).
190. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140.
191. See King, 569 U.S. at 447 (“In some circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special
law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search
or seizure reasonable.’”).
192. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997).
193. King, 569 U.S. at 448.
194. Id. at 436 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 (2006)).
195. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
196. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
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The legislative purpose of California’s DNA Act is clear: the Act
serves as an investigative tool, not an identification tool.197 Proponents
of the DNA Act promised that it would help “solve crimes, free those
wrongfully accused, and stop serial killers.”198 Likewise, the findings
section of the proposed law declared that it would “solve crime[s],”
“apprehend perpetrators,” expand the number of “cold hits and
criminal investigation links,” and thereby “substantially reduce the
number of unsolved crimes.”199 As previously mentioned, the very
first subsection under Proposition 69’s Declaration of Purpose reads,
“Our communities have a compelling interest in protecting themselves
from crime.”200 Though identification of arrestees is mentioned as one
of the legislative purposes of Proposition 69, it is certainly not the end
goal.201
It is unclear why the California Court of Appeal did not revisit the
Fourth Amendment question when Buza was remanded to be
reconsidered in light of King.202 In its pre-remand opinion, the
California Court of Appeal made convincing arguments that the DNA
Act does in fact violate arrestees’ Fourth Amendment rights.203 The
California Court of Appeal distinguished a number of cases in which
the United States Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches and
seizures, and emphasized that each of those cases involved defendants
that had already been indicted or convicted.204
The California Court of Appeal fully appreciated the statutory
scheme of the DNA Act and noted the high court’s indifference to the
197. Proposition 69 (DNA), supra note 1.
198. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2004, GENERAL ELECTION 62
(2004), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2236&context=ca_ballot_
props.
199. Id. at 135.
200. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 17.
201. Proposition 69’s Declarations of Purpose later mentions that “[l]aw enforcement should
be able to use the DNA Database and Data Bank Program to substantially reduce the number of
unsolved crimes . . . .” Id.
202. After the ruling in King, the California Court of Appeal arguably could have still
distinguished Buza’s case on federal constitutional grounds based on the differences between the
Maryland and California statutes. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S, 435, 447–48 (2013); People v.
Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 763 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 2018).
203. See generally Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795 (“It has been stated, with respect to the federal
Constitution, that because ‘[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusion on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained’ . . . ‘the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.’”).
204. Id. at 763.
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“second search” that occurs under the DNA Act, when the DNA
sample is analyzed and a profile is created for use in state and federal
DNA databases.205 This part, the court argued, should be the true focus
of the Fourth Amendment analysis.206 The California Court of Appeal
rightfully found that there was no non-law enforcement reason for
creating a DNA profile with an arrestee’s cheek swab.207 Because the
special needs exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, and
because no other exception to the warrant requirement applied,
individualized suspicion was required.208 Because there was no
individualized suspicion in Buza’s case, the search was
unreasonable.209
2. California’s DNA Act Violates Article I, Section 13 of the
California Constitution
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides, in
essentially identical language to the United States Constitution: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be
violated . . . .”210 Regardless of its nearly identical language, “the
California Constitution is, and has always been, ‘a document of
independent force’ that sets forth rights that are in no way ‘dependent
on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.’ (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 24).”211 Though the Buza majority affirmed the independence
of California’s Constitution, it failed to consider whether there existed
any cogent reasons, independent state interests, or strong
countervailing circumstances that would have supported a finding that
California’s DNA Act violates the California Constitution.212
On various prior occasions, the California Supreme Court has
decided questions pertaining to the legality of searches and seizures
solely under article I, section 13 of the California Constitution when
the United State Supreme Court had not yet decided the parallel
question under the Fourth Amendment.213 It is a plausible argument
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 762–63.
Id.
Id. at 766–68.
Id. at 775.
Id. 795–96.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1148 (Cal. 2018) (citations omitted).
Id.
See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 702 P.2d 170, 175–76 (Cal. 1985).
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that King and Buza presented similar, if not identical, legal questions
as they pertained to the Fourth Amendment analysis.214 Regardless,
the Buza majority erred when it evaluated the “constitutionality of
searches and seizures under our state Constitution by employing the
same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King.”215 The
Buza court improperly relied on the reasoning of the King Court,
which construed a different statute and a different constitution.216
The California Constitution extends protections to its citizens
beyond those provided in the federal context.217 The California
Constitution provides heightened protections for the privacy rights of
individuals, even arrestees.218 For example, the California Supreme
Court held that “the search of [an arrestee’s] person beyond the scope
of a pat-down was unlawful under article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution.”219 In search and seizure cases, the California Supreme
Court has “require[d] a more exacting standard” for cases arising in
the state.220 Even full custodial arrest, booking, and incarceration do
not authorize a warrantless search of a person.221
Additionally, in contrast to the United States Constitution, the
California Constitution contains an express statement about the
importance of personal privacy: “All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are . . .
pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy.”222 Though courts have not found
that article I, section 1 confers an independent right to privacy separate
214. In both cases the issue was whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and
analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested for, but not yet convicted of, felony charges. See
Buza, 413 P.3d at 1135; see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (holding that “when
officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the
suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).
215. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1148. Additionally, “[t]hough the United States Supreme Court may
have reached a different conclusion when evaluating another state’s DNA collection statute under
the federal Constitution, the role of our state charter, the unique importance it assigns to privacy,
and the differences between the statute[s]” suggest that the Buza court should have found the Act
unconstitutional. Id. at 1164 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990) (listing the “numerous decisions”
from the California Supreme Court “interpreting the state Constitution as extending protection to
our citizens beyond the limits imposed by the high court”).
218. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1163.
219. People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1976).
220. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1165 (citing People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1009, 1099 (Cal. 1975)).
221. Id. (citing People v. Laiwa, 669 P.2d 1278, 1278 (Cal. 1983)).
222. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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from article I, section 13, courts have neither found that the language
is devoid of meaning.223 At a minimum, this addition to California’s
Constitution underscores the importance the state places on citizens’
privacy rights.
Finally, in deciding whether the California Constitution provides
protection against the search and seizure in Buza, the court was
obligated to perform an independent analysis.224 Instead, the Buza
majority mistakenly relied on the holding in King, even for its analysis
under the California Constitution.225 Because of the California
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the protections afforded to
arrestees, and because of the California Constitution’s explicit privacy
protection, the Buza court should have engaged in an independent
analysis of California’s DNA Act.
B. A Missed Opportunity
In the majority opinion, Justice Kruger conceded that California’s
DNA Act “may raise additional constitutional questions that will
require resolution in other cases.”226 Nevertheless, the majority opted
not to explore Buza’s argument that the DNA Act is facially
unconstitutional as applied to other arrestees.227 The majority opinion,
written by usually-liberal-voting Justice Kruger,228 missed a huge
opportunity
to
reassert
California’s
seemingly-forgotten
constitutionalism.
The Buza majority declined to address an issue that it could and
should have: whether it is constitutional to require a DNA sample to
be taken and analyzed after an arrest but before a finding of probable

223. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1167.
224. People v. Teresinski, 640 P.2d 753, 760–761 (Cal. 1982) (“[T]he California courts, in
interpreting the constitution of this state, are not bound by federal precedent construing the parallel
federal text . . . [T]he ‘state courts, in interpreting constitutional guarantees contained in the
constitutions, are “independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.”’”).
225. The court analyzed the constitutionality of searches and seizures under the California
Constitution by employing the same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King. Buza,
413 P.3d at 1148 (majority opinion).
226. Id. at 1155.
227. Id. (citing People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 463 (Cal. 2018)) (“We accordingly abide by
what has been called a ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more,
it is not necessary to decide more.’”).
228. Justice Kruger, who normally delivers a liberal-leaning vote, played the tie-breaking role
in the Buza opinion. It was Justice Kruger who did not deliver the fourth liberal vote that would
have gained the dissenting justices the majority. See David Aram Kaiser, Opinion Analysis: People
v. Buza, SCOCA BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), http://scocablog.com/opinion-analysis-people-v-buza/.
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cause has been made.229 As mentioned above, the most important
distinction between California’s DNA Act and the Maryland DNA
Collection Act is that the DNA Act allows DNA to be taken and
analyzed prior to a probable cause finding for the arrest, whereas the
Maryland law applies only to arrestees who are already in custody for
an offense supported by probable cause.230 By refusing to reach the
constitutional question posed above, the Buza majority essentially
eliminated any significant difference between California’s DNA Act
and Maryland’s DNA Collection Act. In doing so, the majority reframed the constitutional issues of the case, which resulted in the
majority and dissents disagreeing about crucial points and missing
many of the arguments regarding California constitutionalism.
Both Justice Liu and Justice Cuéllar made arguments in their
dissents that the majority opinion failed to respect California’s
constitutional independence.231 Heavily focusing on California
constitutionalism, Justice Cuéllar’s dissent read like the majority that
could have been. Justice Cuéllar outlined a state-specific history for a
broader constitutional right to privacy under the California
Constitution than is found in the United States Constitution.232 He
reminded the majority that the “core value” of article I, section 1 of
the California Constitution was protecting so-called “informational
privacy,” meaning the privacy interest in sensitive and confidential
personal information.233 Based on this state-specific history, Justice
Cuéllar argued that the majority failed “to do justice to the importance
of state constitutional rights.”234
The late Justice Stanley Mosk would have appreciated Justice
Cuéllar’s attempt to reassert and re-analyze California’s independent
constitutionalism. Justice Mosk used to be the strong voice on the
229. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1145 (“[W]e again note that defendant raised no such argument in the
trial court and we decline to decide the constitutional necessity of such a rule in a case in which
probable cause have never been contested.”).
230. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48 (2013).
231. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1163 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
232. Indeed, Justice Cuéllar provided a lengthy list of case law supporting his argument that
California has “been quite explicit in holding that article I, section 13 provides greater protection
than does the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1165. Additionally, Justice Cuéllar noted that article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution “grew out of the electorate’s fears of ‘increased surveillance
and data collection activity in contemporary society,’ and was intended to address the potential
collection, stockpiling, and use of individual’s most personal information in an arbitrary and
unjustified fashion.” Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 1168.
234. Id.
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California Supreme Court for criminal procedure rights. As mentioned
above, California’s state constitutionalism has ebbed and flowed,
depending on the political make-up of both the United States Supreme
Court and the California Supreme Court. In addition to the political
make-up of the courts, Justice Mosk also attributed losses in the field
of state constitutionalism to “ill-conceived legislative measures
designed to curtail judicial independence.”235 Indeed, he scathingly
described ill-conceived legislative measures as “handcuffs on [his]
court’s wrists.”236
In light of the now-conservative Supreme Court majority, it is
more important than ever for California to reassert its independent
state constitutionalism. The state-specific history giving rise to
California’s broader privacy rights and criminal procedural rights
lends credence to an argument supporting a step in the right direction:
a step toward independent state constitutionalism. The California
Supreme Court should strive to provide case rulings consistent with
article I, section 1 of the California Constitution and consistent with
case precedent that provides the appropriate constitutional safeguards
to California citizens.
C. A Brief Suggestion
The Buza majority argued that the provisions of the DNA Act are
reasonable because the Act provides for “identification of
arrestees.”237 The court conceded that taking DNA serves the same
purpose as asking an arrestee for his name or asking him to provide
fingerprints.238 If the true legislative purpose of Proposition 69 is the
identification and expeditious booking of felony suspects, then why
not just require felony arrestees to provide only fingerprints upon
booking?
As Justice Cuéllar mentioned in his dissent, creating a DNA
profile and analyzing an arrestee’s DNA can take thirty days to
235. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism After Warren: Avoiding the Potomac’s Ebb and
Flow, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE
201, 201 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985).
236. Id.
237. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140 (majority opinion) (noting that expeditious identification of the
individual arrested allows officers to obtain the suspect’s criminal history and decide how to
proceed based thereon, ensures that persons accused of crimes are available for trial, allows courts
to assess whether the arrestee should be released on bail, and acts as a tool to free persons
wrongfully accused for the same offense).
238. Id.
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complete; on the other hand, law enforcement can collect an arrestee’s
fingerprints, compare them to an electronic database, and retrieve
identifying information in approximately twenty-seven minutes.239
Proposition 69 should be amended to reflect this science. An
appropriate and simple amendment to Proposition 69 would be to
require a DNA sample only if the felony arrestee refuses to provide
his fingerprints. Such an amendment would incentivize arrestees to
provide legitimate identifying information and would not dismantle
the legislative purpose of Proposition 69.
VI. CONCLUSION
Buza highlights the struggle to balance governmental interests
and individual privacy expectations. “The tension between the two
themes—due process and crime control—has never been resolved and
perhaps never can be. A balance must always be struck. The word
balance may be unfortunate; it implies stability.”240
“The California Constitution is not some minor codicil to the
United States Constitution.”241 The Buza majority, in failing to
reassert California’s constitutionalism, took a step in the wrong
direction for criminal procedural laws and constitutional interpretation
in general in California. The court refused an important opportunity to
re-ignite the Mosk-era progressivity and instead rolled over and
allowed the ruling of the emerging conservative-majority United
States Supreme Court to take hold. The Buza court had an opportunity
to put an end to the genetic fishing expeditions made possible by
Proposition 69 and, unfortunately, missed that mark.

239. Id. at 1169 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
240. Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nineteenth
Century, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 271, 278 (Paul
Finkelman et al. eds., 1991).
241. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1164.

